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Abstract 
The purpose of the current paper was to develop a measurement of information security culture. Our 
literature analysis indicated a lack of clear conceptualization and distinction between factors that 
constitute information security culture and factors that influence information security culture. A 
sequential mixed method consisting of a qualitative phase to explore the conceptualisation of 
information security culture, and a quantitative phase to validate the model is adopted for this 
research. Eight interviews with information security experts in eight different Saudi organisations 
were conducted, revealing that security culture can be constituted as reflection of security awareness 
and security ownership. Additionally, the qualitative interviews have revealed that factors that 
influence security culture are top management involvement, policy enforcement, and training. These 
factors were confirmed formed the basis for our initial information security culture model, which was 
operationalised and tested in different Saudi Arabian organisations. Using data from two hundred 
and fifty-four valid responses, we demonstrated the validity and reliability of the information security 
culture model. We were further able to demonstrate the validity of the model in a nomological net, as 
well as provide some preliminary findings on the factors that influence information security culture. 
Keywords: Security Culture, Factors Influence Security Culture, Factors Constitute Security Culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the major benefits of information security culture creation is the protection of the organization 
assets in which will have “direct interaction with information assets and thereby minimize the threats 
that user behaviour poses to the protection of information assets” (Da Veiga, 2008) (p.1). The 
importance of creating a security culture within organization settings arises from the fact that the 
human dimension in information security is always considered to be the weakest link (Da Veiga. & 
Eloff, 2007; Martins & Eloff, 2002; Maynard & Ruighaver, 2002; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003, van 
Niekerk. & von Solms, 2005). Therefore, the creation of an information security culture is necessary 
for effective information security management (J. Eloff & Eloff, 2005; M. Eloff & von Solms, 2000). 
The current paper has reviewed some common security culture definitions in order to gain 
understanding of what constitute security culture. Some of the definitions found for security culture 
are: 
 Schlienger and Teufel (2003) (P.405) state that information security culture is “a subculture in 
regards to content”. They declare:  
Security culture encompasses all socio-cultural measures that support technical security 
measures, so that information security becomes a natural aspect in the daily activities of every 
employee.  
 Dhillon, (1999)(P.90) defines security culture as:  
The totality of human attributes such as behaviours, attitudes and values that contribute to the 
protection of all kinds of information in a given organisation. 
 Von Solms (2000) (p.618) calls for security culture creation within organization: By instilling 
the aspects of information security to every employee as a natural way of performing his or 
her daily job. 
Despite the importance of the previous definitions in recognising the need to create security culture in 
order to manage security effectively, there is little information about what constitutes or 
conceptualizes security culture (Ramachandran, Srinivasan, & Goles, 2004). The definitions did not 
offer a clear understanding of what constituted or conceptualized security culture. This general lack of 
agreement on just what constitutes a security culture presents a dilemma in terms of identifying 
factors or elements that are necessary for the creation of a security culture. This paper attempts to fill 
this gap by developing an information security culture measurement model that will conceptualize 
security culture.  
2 MODEL AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
A comprehensive review of information security culture was conducted in order to develop an 
understanding of information security culture measurement. The purpose of the comprehensive 
review is to identify and examine factors that constitutes or reflect security culture and factors that 
influence security culture in order to develop information security culture measurement model. The 
findings of this review indicated there are only two information security culture research models that 
have provided a reliable and valid information security culture assessment instrument (Da Veiga & 
Eloff, 2009; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). In the first of these, Schlienger and Teufel (2005) designed a 
questionnaire to obtain an understanding of official rules intended to influence the security behaviour 
of employees. In the second, an instrument was developed by Da Veiga, and Eloff (2009) designed to 
cultivate information security culture.  
The existing literature has emphasized the importance of information security culture and provided 
suggestions and guidelines on how to assess information security culture. However, the findings of 
the comprehensive review revealed that there is little clarification as to what exact factors constitute 
security culture and as to what factors influence or drive the creation of security culture. The 
distinction clearly has not been made by academic literature on the information security culture. These 
literature analyses have not provided a clear understanding of how security culture must be 
conceptualized in order for researchers to develop an instrument for the understanding and 
 measurement of an information security culture model. Therefore, the comprehensive review 
illustrated the lack of empirical measurement in the information security culture area. As a result, the 
current paper will take this initiative and develop an information security culture measurement model 
that clearly distinguishes between what factors constitute security culture and what factors influence 
or drive the security culture. In order to achieve this goal, an open ended interview will be 
implemented to develop the information security culture measurement model.  
2.1 Qualitative Data Findings  
This paper conducted eight separate interviews from eight different organisations across public, semi-
pubic, and private sectors; different sizes were also included, ranging from small to large 
organisations. Table 1 presented the demographic information profile for each organization. The 
participants’ roles however were as information security managers or as experts in their respective 
organisations. Because of space and scope limitations, the current paper would not discuss the 
qualitative interviews findings analysis in details. 
Organisation Organisation Type Organisation Size Type of Industry 
A Semi-Public 400 Government Regulators 
B Private 800 Consulting, Auditing, Assurance 
C Private 3100 IT, Network, System 
D Semi-Public 100 IT 
E Semi-Public 1150 Health, Education, Research 
F Public 3000 Healthcare 
G Private 1000 Banking and Financial 
H Private 3000 Banking and Financial 
Table 1. Demographic Information Profile 
2.1.1 Factors constitute security culture 
Based on the qualitative interviews findings, security culture was constituted as reflection of security 
awareness and security ownership. Some quotes are provided below  
On Security Awareness: 
In order to change the security culture, we need to improve our security awareness around 
here (Organization A). 
On Security Ownership: 
We do not expect to create security culture in my organization since our staffs do not 
understand the importance of protecting information security (Organization F). 
2.1.2 Factors influence security culture 
Based on the qualitative interviews findings, factors influence security culture is top management 
involvement in information security, information security policy enforcement and security training.  
On Top Management Involvement: 
Excellent top management participations and involvement is the most important factors for 
creating information security culture (Organization H).  
To create or expect some sort of security culture, top management must be involved. 
(Organization E). 
On Policy Enforcement:  
One of the key factors for effective information security culture in my organization is being 
able to enforce the security policy (Organization D).  
On security training:  
Security training is the one of effective and successful factors for establishing information 
security culture in my organization (Organization B).  
 2.2 Factors Constituting Security Culture 
2.2.1 Security awareness 
Siponen (2000) (p.31) defined security awareness as “A state where users in an organisation are 
aware, ideally committed to, of their security mission”. Security awareness has been well 
acknowledged in the literature to be an essential component for creating security culture. Von Solms 
(2000) refers to the third wave of information security, called the institutionalization wave, often 
discussed under the title “information security awareness” and more recently under the title 
“information security culture”. Earlier researchers referred to security culture as advanced stages of 
security awareness of organisations. Instilling a security culture is achieved through security 
awareness, knowledge and skills (Tarimo, 2006). The importance of security awareness for the 
establishment of a security culture has been acknowledged by other researchers in the literature. For 
example, van Niekerk and von Solms, (2005) state that as security culture is closely related to security 
behaviour, analysing security awareness levels will directly contribute to the establishment and 
maintenance of a security culture. The ISO/IEC standard states that security awareness of all 
employees is an essential element of effective security and contributes positively to an improved 
security culture (International Standards Organization ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 2004).  
2.2.2 Security Ownership  
It is important for staff in any organisation to understand their security roles and responsibilities, in 
order to enhance their security performance and thus the organisation’s security performance. By 
understanding their responsibilities and the importance of protecting information security, staffs are 
able to understand what security risks are associated with their actions. This will increase their 
security awareness levels, which will increase compliance with the security policy of the organisation. 
For this reason, employee responsibility and ownership of the need to protect information security is 
an important aspect of creating a security culture (Koh et al., 2005; Maynard & Ruighaver, 2002; 
Ramachandran et al., 2004; Tarimo, 2006). By being responsible and having a sense of ownership, 
staff behaviour will change with respect to protecting organisational assets, leading to the creation of 
a security culture.  
2.3 Factors Influencing Security Culture 
2.3.1 Top Management Involvement in Information Security 
Fourie (2003) indicated that top management can be involved by defining and communicating a 
security policy, allocating specific responsibilities to appointed people, making resources available for 
the continual upkeep of information security and control, and constantly monitoring and reviewing 
information security effectiveness. Many researchers have asserted that top management is an 
essential part of the establishment of a security culture (Chia et al., 2003; D’Arcy & Greene, 2009; Da 
Veiga & Eloff, 2007, 2009; Dojkovski et al., 2007; Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem, 2009; Martins & 
Eloff, 2002; Maynard & Ruighaver, 2002; OECD, 2003; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003, 2005; Tarimo, 
2006; van Niekerk & von Solms, 2005, 2006). Gaunt (2000) argued that when creating an information 
security culture, commitment from the management and strong leadership is necessary at an initial 
stage to succeed in the long term. In addition, Knapp, et al (2006) found that top management support 
is the most important significant predictor of security culture and level of policy enforcement. A 
security culture would not be easily established without strong and consistent involvement from the 
top management of the organisation.   
2.3.2 Information Security Policy Enforcement 
A security policy is important for the creation of a security culture. OECD (2003) reports that for 
security awareness to succeed, it needs a foundation of security policies. Security policies are 
extremely important and should be included in an organisation’s information security program. It is 
important to cultivate an information security culture in an organisation and understand how the 
 culture can be integrated with the security policy (Kluge, 1998). This is important because the 
superficial goal of security culture is to influence the behaviour of the employees to comply with the 
official security policy (Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). Nevertheless, even though some organisations 
have an established security policy, this does not ensure that employees will necessarily obey these 
policies (Von Solms & von Solms, 2004). Therefore, consistent enforcement of the security policy 
will assist the effectiveness of information security policy and must be an organisational priority in 
order to create security mind culture.  
2.3.3 Information Security Training 
Organisations need to ensure that “an information security culture is inculcated through training, 
education and awareness raising, in order to minimize risks to information assets” (Da Veiga & Eloff, 
2007) (P.149). This implication conforms to the assertion that an effective security culture represents 
one of the necessary foundations for information security management and cannot be achieved 
without appropriate attention to security awareness, training and education for all ICT users (Tarimo, 
2006). Companies can be assisted to establish a security culture through various approaches that are 
based on policy, awareness, training and education (Furnell, Gennatou, & Dowland, 2001; 
Lichtenstein & Swatman, 2001; Lim, Ahmad, Chang, & Maynard, 2010; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003). 
Education of employees in terms of their security roles and responsibilities is a crucial aspect of 
security culture (R. von Solms & S. von Solms, 2004). Security training can contribute to the security 
culture creation by improving employees’ behaviour and increasing their security awareness levels. 
This might be reflected in their security behaviour should they then follow the security policy which 
initially gave rise to the necessary creation of the security culture.  
Based on the previous discussion the following hypotheses were emerged: 
 HI: Security culture is constituted mainly of two reflective factors: (a) Security Awareness, (b) 
Security Ownership. 
 H2: Top Management Involvement, Information Security Policy Enforcement, and Information 
Security Training are factors that have positive and significant influence on security culture. 
Figure 1 depicts the developed information security culture measurement model based on the 
qualitative interviews findings and the synthesized literature review. 
Security Culture
Security Awareness
Security Ownership
Factors Influence Security Culture
Top Management Support
Policy Enforcement
Information Security Training
 
Figure 1. Information Security Culture Model 
 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Construction of Scales  
The scales were developed through an iterative process of extracting candidate questionnaire items 
directly from the interview response questions and the panel experts’ feedback. It is advisable to adapt 
measurement scales of these constructs. This consideration of scale items helps to assure content 
validity (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Therefore, a significant number of the scales used were 
adapted from previous reliable and validated instruments (D’Arcy & Greene, 2009; Da Veiga. et al., 
2007; Knapp. et al., 2006). However, the qualitative interviews and expert panel judgments have 
suggested the need to add more item scales for each construct to demonstrate the appropriate 
constructs. Moreover, the security ownership construct was constructed since there was a lack of 
academic representation for the security ownership construct. Please note the items derived from the 
qualitative interviews findings were not discussed in this paper because of the scope limitation.  
For each of these constructs, pools of candidate items were generated from the literature (i e, D’Arcy 
& Greene, 2009; Da Veiga. et al., 2007; Knapp. et al., 2006), qualitative interviews findings, and 
panel experts feedback to add more scales in order to develop the appropriate theoretical constructs. 
After creating the items needed to develop the theoretical constructs, the items were worded in the 
form of a statement to which the respondent indicated his/her perception of the extent of agreement on 
a 5-point likert scale with the end points ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘strongly agree’. 
3.2 Expert Panel and Instrument Refinement 
After generation of the initial pools of candidate items was the establishment if the construct validity 
of the candidate items to display the convergent and discriminant validity. The current paper followed 
the recommendations of Moore and Benbasat’s (1991) study which employed ‘Own Category Test’ to 
ensure the construct validity (Davis, 1989; Sherif & Sherif, 1967). This can be achieved by asking a 
panel of experts with a strong background in information security system records to sort candidate 
items into a number of constructs to ensure the identify domain substrata of the primary theatrical 
constructs (Moore & Benbasat, 1991; Recker, 2008). Each panel member was asked to place the 
candidate items in the correspondent constructs. This helped to assess the convergence and 
representativeness of the items. It is also important to assess whether panel members placed the same 
candidate items in the respective constructs. This ensured cluster reliability demonstration by 
assessing the items placed in the target constructs across all members (Recker, 2008). All of the items 
were found categorized in the correspondent constructs according to the panel expert’s 
categorizations.  
Afterwards, a pool of candidate items was reduced to the potential candidate items in order to improve 
the validity and reliability of the final set of items. This was achieved by following the index card 
sorting test which was established by (Davis, 1989; Moore & Benbasat, 1991). If any items were 
found within a particular category, then it demonstrated convergent validity with the construct 
associated with the category, and discriminant validity with the others (Recker, 2008). This sorting 
test was conducted by a panel of four judges with a strong background in information system 
securities that had randomly given items on printing index cards and were asked to sort these cards 
into categories. The panel of judges were asked to classify items into given categories and identify 
items that were ambiguous. This approach ensured highly reliable and valid instruments.  
After revising the questionnaires, pilot testing was conducted with twenty participants from Saudi 
Arabian organisations to evaluate the questionnaire for clarity, bias, ambiguous questions and 
relevance to the Saudi Arabian business environment. Fifteen respondents offered valid feedback that 
was considered sufficient for serving the purpose (Burns & Bush, 1998). The operational details of the 
security factors influence security culture constructs and factors constitutes security culture, in terms 
of the dimensions along with the measurement variables and references, are presented in Table 2.  
Dimension Measurement Variables References 
Top 
Management 
TPM1 Top management considers information security an 
important organisational priority  
(Knapp et al., 2006) 
 Involvement 
In 
Information 
Security 
TPM2 Senior management gives strong and consistent support to 
the security program 
(Knapp et al., 2006) 
TPM3 
Senior management is always involved in key information 
security activities. 
Qualitative Data* 
and experts 
feedback/input 
TPM4 
Management ensures that appropriate individuals are made 
responsible for specific aspects of information security 
Qualitative Data* 
and experts 
feedback/input 
TPM5 Management ensures that everyone who takes information 
security actions, and makes information security decisions 
and are held accountable for their decisions and actions 
Qualitative Data* 
and experts 
feedback/input 
Information 
Security 
Policy 
Enforcements 
PE1 Information security practices and procedures are 
continually monitored to ensure compliance with security 
policy 
(Da Veiga, Martin, 
and Eloff, 2007) 
PE2 
Information security practices and procedures are externally 
audited 
Qualitative Data* 
and experts 
feedback/input 
PE3 Information security violations are reported to the proper 
authority 
(Knapp et al., 2007) 
PE4 
Actions against violations are always taken 
Qualitative Data* 
and experts 
feedback/input 
Information 
Security 
Training 
T1 
I receive adequate information security training 
(D’Arcy and 
Greene, 2009) 
T2 
Information security policy is communicated well 
Qualitative Data* 
and experts 
feedback/input 
T3 I am always educated or trained about new security policies (Knapp et al., 2007) 
Information 
Security 
Awareness 
AW1 I am aware of my information security roles and 
responsibilities 
(Chalua, 2006) 
AW2 I am aware of the risk of not following the information 
security policy 
Qualitative Data* 
and experts 
feedback/input 
AW3 I am familiar with the information security policy Qualitative Data* 
and experts 
feedback/input 
AW4 I am aware of the procedures for reporting security policy 
violations 
(D’Arcy and 
Greene, 2009) 
Information 
Security 
Ownerships 
OWN1 It is my responsibility to protect the information of my 
organisation 
Qualitative Data* 
and experts 
feedback/input 
OWN2 I take ownership of the outcomes of my information 
security decisions and actions    
OWN3 Protecting information security is an important part of my 
job 
*: Items Derived from Qualitative Data are beyond the scope of this paper 
Table 2. Research Model Construct Operationalisation Statements 
3.3 Questionnaires Administration   
A questionnaire survey was conducted in Saudi Arabia from March to May 2010. Postal mail was 
chosen as the primary means of distributing the survey instrument. To improve the response rate, a 
web-based version of the questionnaire was also developed as an alternative method for respondents 
to use. The survey packages (a cover letter explaining the purposes and benefits of the survey, and a 
set of questions) were mailed to 200 Saudi Arabian organisations covering all the country’s regions, 
types and sizes. Respondents came from a variety of organisational levels, geographic locations, 
backgrounds, education levels and ages. One hundred and fifty questionnaires were returned by mail 
and one hundred and fifty surveys were completed online. Forty-six of the returned questionnaires 
 were excluded from the analysis, due to significant incompletion. As a result, 254 valid responses 
from 64 organisations remained. A 32 per cent response rate is considered satisfactory for research 
conducted in the information security field (Kotulic & Clark, 2004). The profiles of the survey sample 
respondents are summarized in Table 3. Table 4 demonstrated the descriptive statistics for each 
statement in our research model. 
 %  %  % 
Organisation Type  Organisation Size  Organisation Industry  
Private 48.8 1-499 24.8 Financial 18.9 
Public 29.5 500-4999 40.9 Education 14.2 
Non- Profit 1.2 more than 5000 34.3 Telecommunications 10.6 
Semi-Public 20.5 Participants Age  IT 9.4 
Job  Title  21-30 46.9 Insurance 8.7 
Security  Staff 13.4 31-40 39.8 Health are 8.3 
IT Staff 39.8 41-50 11.0 Construction 7.1 
Users Staff 46.9 51-60 2.4 Others 22.9 
Table 3. Frequencies of Demographic Variables 
Variable  Mean SD SE Variable  Mean SD SE 
TPM1 4.10 .94 .059 T1 2.83 1.13 .081 
TPM2 3.88 .98 .062 T2 3.18 .94 .068 
TPM3 
 
3.54 1.05 .067 
T3 
2.83 .98 .076 
TPM4 3.58 1.12 .071 AW1 3.72 1.03 .065 
TPM5 3.61 1.04 .065 AW2 3.87 1.01 .064 
PE1 3.64 1.08 .068 AW3 3.63 1.03 .066 
PE2 3.33 1.13 .074 AW4 3.28 1.14 .073 
PE3 3.43 .94 .071 OWN1 3.99 1.0 .068 
PE4 3.42 .98 .067 OWN2 3.98 .96 .061 
    OWN3 4.04 1.0 .067 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistic for Model statements 
4 MODEL RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY  
To ensure that such a set of measurement scales consistently and accurately captured the meaning of 
the constructs, an analysis of scale reliability was performed through an assessment of internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient) and inter-total correlations (Pallant, 2005). The values of 
the alpha Cronbach’s coefficient of all the construct scales ranged from 0.847 to 0.906, suggesting 
good internal consistency and reliability for the scales with this sample (See Table 5). Additionally, 
the results of item-total correlations presented in Tables 6 show that all of the variables within each 
construct measure the actual construct, as their corrected item-total correlations were greater than 
0.30.  
Constructs 
Measurement Scale 
Number of 
Variables 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Constructs 
Measurement Scale 
Number of 
Variables 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Top Management 
Involvement  
5 .870 Awareness 4 .906 
Policy Enforcement  4 .820 Ownership 3 .847 
Training  3 .842    
Table 5. Cronbach’s alphas of measurement scales for Each Construct 
Variables Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
Variables Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
TPM1 .740 .833 T1 .701 .787 
TPM2 .774 .824 T2 .671 .814 
 TPM3 .740 .831 T3 .751 .737 
TPM4 .637 .859 AW1 .814 .869 
TPM5 .602 .865 AW2 .806 .873 
PE1 .563 .783 AW3 .820 .867 
PE2 .685 .810 AW4 .722 .905 
PE3 .704 .754 OWN1 .737 .766 
PE4  .746 OWN2 .686 .826 
   OWN3 .726 .776 
Table 6. Item-total correlations of all statements  
Afterwards, validity was achieved using EFA and CFA. EFA is particularly useful as a preliminary 
analysis in the absence of a sufficiently detailed theory about the relations of the variables to the 
underlying constructs (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). The factorability refers to the suitability of the 
data to be factorized in terms of the inter-correlation between variables (Pallant, 2005; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). As the variables included in the analysis were deemed to measure the same underlying 
construct, a correlation matrix that was factorable needed to include sizable values for the correlation 
(Field, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity are 
generally applied to determine the factorability of such a matrix (Pallant, 2005). The strength of the 
inter-correlations among the variables within each construct was supported by the inspection of the 
correlation matrix with evidence of coefficients greater than 0.30. As presented in Table 7, the values 
of Kaiser-Meyer- Olkin (KMO) of constructs was 0.932 making them well above the minimum 
acceptable level of 0.60 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Finally, Bartlett’s test of sphericity for each 
construct was highly significant at p < 0.001 level, indicating that there were adequate relationships 
between the variables included in the analysis (Field, 2005).  
Construct KMO 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Factor Influence Security Culture and Factors 
Constitutes Security Culture 
.932 Approx. Chi-Square df Sig. 
4241.558 378 .000 
Table 7. KMO and Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
Then, the Varimax orthogonal rotation was the preferred method, since it was the simplest and most 
commonly used rotation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). A specific criterion was employed to justify the 
significance of the factor loadings after the factor had been rotated. A factor loading of 0.50 and 
above was considered significant at the 0.05 level to obtain a power level of 80% with a sample of 
254 (Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Considering the above criteria, table 8 detailed 
procedures of the EFA for each individual construct (after suppressing loadings of less than 0.4).  
Variable Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
TPM1     .818     
TPM2     .815     
TPM3     .781     
TPM4     .678     
TPM5    .549     
PE1   .507      
PE2   .646       
PE3   .679       
PE4   .665       
T1       .712   
T2       .668   
T3       .776   
AW1 .726         
AW2 .718         
 AW3 .745         
AW4 .691         
OWN1         .803 
OWN2         .792 
OWN3         .781 
Eigen value 12.046 3.149 1.533 1.341 1.017 
% Variance 43.02 11.245 5.474 4.788 3.632 
Cumulative Variance explained 43.03 54.268 59.74 64.53 68.12 
Table 8. Rotated factor loadings of the Research Model Constructs 
To strengthen the EFA results, CFA was employed to further refine and support the identified factor 
structures. This process involved assessing how well the factor structure of each construct fitted the 
data and examining the model parameters to assess construct validity. These factors were treated as a 
CFA model so that they could portray a set of relationships showing how the measured variables 
represented a latent factor (Hair et al., 2006). Assessing construct validity using the CFA involved an 
examination of convergent validity and discriminant validity.  
The CFA was performed on each construct using the AMOS (version 18.0) program. The covariance 
matrix was automatically used as an input data set as a default in AMOS (Shah & Goldstein, 2006). 
The results are presented in Tables 9 and 10. The factor loading, critical value and significance level 
of each variable shown in the tables provided a measure for the convergent validity; the value of R² 
provided a measure with which to assess the reliability of the variables; and the value of the 
correlation between the factors provided an indication of the discriminant validity.  
The CFA results of the factors that influence the security culture construct are presented in Table 9. 
The model appears to have an adequate fit: X² = 94.5; df = 41; X²/df = 2.305; GFI = 0.939; AGFI= 
0.901, NFI = 0.913, TLI = 0.951, CFI = 0.964; IFI = 0.964; and RMSEA = 0.072. All the factor 
loadings, ranging from 0.578 to 0.852, were greater than the threshold level of 0.50 and were all 
significant at p < 0.001 level, suggesting convergent validity. Table 10 shows CFA results of the 
factors constituting or reflecting security culture. The model appears to have a good fit: X² = 31.16; df 
= 13; X²/df = 2.397; GFI = 0.966; AGFI= 0.926, NFI = 0.973, TLI = 0.971, CFI = 0.984; IFI = 0.984; 
and RMSEA = 0.074. All the factor loadings, ranging from 0.705 to 0.884, were greater than the 
threshold level of 0.50 and were all significant at p < 0.001 level, suggesting convergent validity. The 
correlation coefficients between factors, at 0.66, were less than 0.850, thus supporting the 
discriminant validity of the construct.  
Factor/Variable 
Factor 
Loading 
CR**** R2 Correlations 
TPM1 .825 f.p. .68 TPM-Policy Enforcement :.79 
 
Policy Enforcement –Training: 
.70 
 
TPM- Training: .56 
TPM2 .852 15.713 .73 
TPM3 .812 14.717 .66 
TPM4 .678 11.589 .46 
TPM5 .657 11.143 .43* 
PE1 .754 f.p. .57 
PE2 .621 9.561 .39 
PE3 .763 11.888 .58 
PE4 .782 12.184 .61 
T1 .782 f.p. .61 
T2 .790 12.389 .62 
T3 .835 12.930 .70 
*: Eliminated because did not a good fit with the data, f.p.: Fixed Parameter for Estimation; ****: Critical ratio 
(CR > 1.96: significant at 0.001 level). 
Table 9. CFA Results of Factors Influence Security Culture  
Factor/Variable Factor Loading CR**** R2 Correlations 
AW1 .886 f.p. .785 AWR-OWN: .66 
AW2 .879 19.040 .772 
AW3 .854 18.235 .730 
 AW4 .755 15.046 .570 
OWN1 .837 f.p. .700 
OWN2 .756 12.631 .572 
OWN3 .826 13.797 .682 
f.p.: Fixed Parameter for Estimation; ****: Critical ratio (CR > 1.96: significant at 0.001 level). 
Table 10. CFA Results of Security Culture  
Additionally, all of the composite reliability constructs have values above 0.60. In fact the lowest 
composite reliability value was .883 according to Table 11 which indicates excellent reliability for the 
construct research model. Furthermore, the average variance extracted for all constructs was greater 
than 0.50 with a lowest construct value of .654 according to Table 11. These results indicate that the 
information security culture measurement model possessed substantial convergent validity. 
Discriminant validity however was also examined using Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) recommended 
conditions for discriminant validity, such as the square root of average variance explained (AVE) for 
all constructs should be larger than all other cross-correlations and all AVEs should have values above 
0.5. The results are presented in Table 12 and indicate that in no case was any correlation between the 
constructs greater than the average square root of AVE (the principal diagonal element) and all the 
AVEs were above the 0.5 threshold as discussed earlier. The AVEs ranged from 0.654 to 0.784. The 
largest squared correlation between policy enforcement and top management involvement was 0.6648 
while the smallest square root of AVE obtained is for policy enforcement with AVE of 0.8087. Thus, 
the discriminant validity of the scales used was adequate for the information security culture 
measurement model.  
Constructs Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted 
Top Management Involvement .915 .725 
Policy Enforcement .883 .654 
Training .902 .754 
Awareness .9355 .784 
Ownership .9045 .759 
Table 11. Composite Reliability and Average Variance Extracted  
Constructs Inter-Construct Correlations 
TPM PE T AWR OWN 
TPM  .8514     
PE . 6648 .8087    
T .4894 .5805 .8683   
AWR .3757 .4668 .4641 .8854  
OWN .3197 .3658 .4196 .583 .8712 
Table 12. Discriminant Validity for Factors Influence Security Culture and Factors Constitute 
Security Culture 
5 MODEL TESTING  
The nomological validity of our information security measurement model is important and essential to 
the existing body of knowledge in the information security culture area because of lack of any 
empirical validated theories in information security culture measurement. Nomological validity 
reflects the extent to which predictions about constructs and measures are accurate from the 
perspective of reasonably well-established theoretical models (Straub et al., 1995). This paper was 
designed to develop and test the nomological (predictive) validity of a measure capturing an 
information security culture measurement model that includes the identification of the relationship 
between factors influencing security culture and factors constituting or reflecting security culture. 
Table 13 presented the measurement model assessment, exhibited an acceptable level of fit (X² = 
252.939, df = 129, X²/df = 1.961, GFI = 0.903, AGFI = 0.871, NFI= .912, TLI = .946, CFI = 0.955, 
IFI = .955, RMSEA = .062). Additionally, the model testing nomological validity fitted the data well 
with CMIN = 356.373, df = 234, P=.000, CMIN/df = 1.5229 < 2. The nomological model posits that 
 security awareness and security ownership are nomologically related to security culture. There are 
strong correlations between security culture and security culture reflection factors (Awareness and 
Ownership) with values of .744 and .588 respectively. Additionally, there is also a strong relationship 
between factors influencing security culture and top management involvement, policy enforcement 
and training with values of .604, .865 and .559 respectively. Furthermore, the relationship between 
factors influencing security culture and factors constituting or reflecting security culture, were 
positive and significant (β = .652, p < .001), with 43 % variance explained in the factors constituting 
or reflecting security culture. Hypotheses H1 and H2 are significantly supported at P < .001, thus 
supporting the nomological validity of the proposed security culture research model measures.  
To further examine the relationship between the components of factors influence security culture and 
factors constituted security culture, a correlation analysis was performed-see Table 14. The results 
indicate that all correlations between factors influencing security culture and factors constituting or 
reflecting security culture are statistically significant.  
Construct/ Factor Factor 
Loading 
CR**** R2 Correlations 
Factors Influence Security Culture    Factors Influence Security 
Culture- Factors Constitute 
Security Culture: .652 
 
Top Management Involvement .777 f.p. .604 
Policy Enforcements .930 8.774 .865 
Training .748 8.386 .559 
Factors Constitute Security Culture    
Security Awareness .863 f.p. .744 
Security Ownership .767 7.281 .588 
f.p.: Fixed Parameter for Estimation; ****: Critical ratio (CR > 1.96: significant at 0.001 level). 
Table 13. Measurement Model Results and Hypothesis Testing 
 Top Management 
Involvement 
Policy 
Enforcement 
Training  Factors Influence 
Security Culture 
Awareness .376 .467 .463 .511 
Ownership .320 .369 .418 .431 
Security Culture .395 .477 .498 .535 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
Table 14. Correlations among components of security culture with the factors influence security 
culture 
To ensure a better fit for our information security culture measurement model, we compare our results 
with the alternative measurement model existing from literature analysis in which did not distinguish 
the difference between factors influence security culture and factors constitute or reflected security 
culture. In the alternative model, security culture was composed of several factors such as top 
management involvement, policy enforcement, training, awareness and ownership. In our information 
security culture measurement model, there was a clear distinction between factors constituting or 
reflecting security culture (awareness and ownership) and factors influencing security culture (top 
management involvement, policy enforcement, and training). We compared our information security 
culture measurement model labelled as ‘Model A’ with the alterative information security culture 
model labelled as ‘Model B’ in order to examine which model might best explain the data. Model B 
exhibited an acceptable level of fit (X²= 301.453, df = 130, X²/df = 2.391, GFI = .883, AGFI=.846, 
NFI= .895, TLI = .926, CFI = .937, IFI = .937, RMSEA= .072). The results of the alternative model 
assessment (Model B) are presented in Table 15.  
Construct/ Factor Factor Loading CR**** R2 
Factors Constitute Security Culture    
Top Management Involvement .752 f.p. .566 
Policy Enforcements .876 8.525 .767 
Training .771 8.327 .594 
Security Awareness .642 7.914 .412 
 Security Ownership .598 7.125 .358 
f.p.: Fixed Parameter for Estimation; ****: Critical ratio (CR > 1.96: significant at 0.001 level). 
Table 15. Alternative Measurement Model Results  
Table 16 compares the goodness of fit statistics for the information security culture measurement 
model (Model A) and the alternative model (Model B). As can be seen, ‘Model A’ has better variable 
indices than ‘Model B’. Additionally, the Chi-square (X²) values of these models were compared with 
those of the original measurement model. Theoretically, if the Chi-square difference between the two 
models is significant, the model exhibiting the better fit indices becomes the preferred model. On the 
other hand, if the Chi-square difference is not significant, the two models are said to have a 
comparable fit (i.e. both models explain the data equally well). In this case, the Chi-square difference 
between the two models (Model A) and (Model B) is significant (48.513) at p < 0.01, suggesting that 
all the model parameters did differ significantly. Additionally, to provide a complementary measure 
for the analysis, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was provided. According to Kline (2005), the 
model with the smallest AIC is the preferred choice. In this case, Model A has lower (AIC) values of 
336.939 compared to 383.452 in Model B. The results indicated that Model A is a more parsimonious 
representation. Consequently, Model A was chosen as the final model that best represented the survey 
data. 
Fit Indices Recommendation value Model A Model B 
X² N/A 252.939 301.453 
df N/A 129 130 
Δ X² N/A - 48.513* 
X²/df < 3:1 1.961 2.319 
GFI > .90 .903 .883 
AGFI > .80 .871 .846 
NFI > .90 .912 .895 
TLI > .90 .946 .926 
CFI > .90 .955 .937 
IFI > .90 .954 .937 
RMSEA < .08 .062 .072 
AIC N/A 336.939 383.452 
*: Significant at p < 0.01 
Table 16. Comparison of Models fit indices 
6 CONTRIBUTION AND FUTURE WORK 
There are some major contributions for the current paper. First of all, the current paper underpinned or 
identified what constitute a security culture through an extensive review of the literature and 
exploratory qualitative interviews. On previous literature such as D’Arcy & Greene, (2009) defined 
security culture as education/communication and management support for security. D’Arcy & Greene, 
(2009) has not clearly distinct what constitute security culture and what influence security culture. 
Therefore, the current paper has clearly made this distinction, in which was dedicated to address what 
constitutes security culture. This constitution of information security culture will serve as a foundation 
for an early understanding of information security culture and is considered a very important 
contribution because of a lack of clear definition and conceptualization. Another contribution is the 
operationalization information security culture measurement model constructs through a literature 
review, qualitative interviews and an appropriate ‘construction of scales’ methodological approach. 
Future research may include investigating the influence of national and organizational culture on 
security culture. Additional future work could be replicating the study in different environments with 
different demographic groups. Finally, another important element that conceptualizes security culture 
is security compliance that must be considered for creating security culture. 
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